The Chief’s words – “Go to Ladakh and make history!” – were ringing in my ears as I left the conference. The burden of expectations had been place on my shoulders and on my unit,1 MECH INF (1 MADRAS). The battalion already had an illustrious history of 212 years, but tradition and history are a continuum. We had participated in every war fought before and after Independence, we were the first to be mechanised and we were to be the first to be inducted into the High Altitude Area (HAA) of Ladakh. With these thoughts, I got down to the task of planning the induction.

Force on the field

1 MECH INF was to take over the 20 BMPs (Infantry Combat Vehicle) of the ad hoc mechanised force already in Ladakh. We had to induct 32 BMP and three Armoured Recovery Vehicles(ARV). The two armoured squadrons had to induct 14 tanks and one ARV each. We required 49 sorties of IL 76 transport aircraft (one sortie could carry two BMPs or one tank/ARV). While the IAF had practiced carriage of tanks in plains, but landing at Leh Airfield – located at 10,300 feet and surrounded by high hills – presents technical difficulties. The IAF rose to the occasion and the entire equipment was safely landed at Leh by the end of Jun 1988. I went to Ambala to oversee the airlift and also flew to Leh a number of times.

I took over the unit in the first week of July and we were to induct by road from Jammu, in end July 1988. This was a formidable challenge as our drivers had never driven in the mountains. We had a 120-vehicle convoy and on the first day, our inexperienced drivers created chaos on the highway. The problem was solved by slowing down the speed to 30 kilometre and I myself drove at the head of the convoy. The 800 km journey to Ladakh is notorious for accidents. All units inducting into Ladakh generally meet with one or two unfortunate mishaps. Our precautions ensured that we arrived in Leh, after five days’ journey, without any mishap.

The unit less one company temporarily settled down at Karu, 40 kilometres from Leh. One company was to be located 120 kilometres to the East at Tangtse for deployment in Chushul Sector, which was another 100 kilometre to the East. The move of this company by road over the 17,500 feet Chang La Pass was a great confidence builder. The BMP is a unique combat vehicle and could maintain the same average speed as heavy wheeled vehicles.

Within a week, we selected the new administrative base for mechanised forces at Stakna, close to Karu. Within two months, the accommodation for the troops and sheds for the equipment were constructed: 50 troops barracks and 15 sheds for tanks and BMPs, along with offices and messes were built in record time (two months). Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw was on a visit to Ladakh at the time and on my request, he inaugurated our Officers Mess and had lunch with us.

As preparation, we went over all terrain and operational reports from the last 40 years, since 1947 and also studied the history of the region. I paid special attention to the campaigns of the great General Zorawar Singh, from 1834-41, when he had captured a vast tract of Tibet, right up to Mansarovar Lake. In fact, he was cremated at Taklakot, near the lake in 1941. The War of 1962 was also analysed in detail, particularly the employment of the six tanks that had been flown into Chushul in November 1962. We also had the benefit of the experience of the ad hoc mechanised force, which was in Ladakh since the end of 1986.

The following challenges were before me:

• Physical fitness and wellbeing of troops in HAA
• Reconnaissance of the operational area
• Evolving the offensive and defensive operational role
• Technical maintenance of the equipment in the extreme climate
• Validating the performance of the tanks and BMPs
• Validating the operational role in field exercises
• Test exercise of the Combat Group by higher HQ.                                     

There is a popular army saying in Ladakh that goes like this: “In the land of the Lama, do not be a Gama (a famous wrestler).” It implies one should not compromise with the laid-down norms of survival in HAA. But soldiers must also be extremely fit to fight in this terrain. Without proper acclimatisation, there is the risk of High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema, which can be fatal. It’s one of the many reasons for non-battle casualties that take place in Ladakh every year. During our two year stay in Ladakh, our unit did not suffer any climate, fire or vehicle accident casualty during its tenure. This was because of education, adherence to norms, strict supervision and personal example. Just this achievement alone made the unit famous in Northern Command.

The terrain of Eastern Ladakh is unique and there is no other place like this in the world. Upto Leh and 150 kilometre beyond, the terrain is extremely rugged with narrow valleys and surrounding hill ranges varying from 15,000 to 23,000 feet. Beyond this the valleys become broader, the base height rises to 14,000-15,000 feet and surrounding hills ranges become more gradual and only 2,000-3,000 feet higher than the valleys. After reconnaissance, the hill features can be negotiated by wheeled vehicles and for tracked vehicles it is a cake walk. In fact, Major Shaitan Singh, PVC, had constructed a jeep-able track from his base at Tara Post (named after his wife) at 15000 feet to Rechin La (at 17,000 feet), which is about one kilometre from Rezang La. During my reconnaissance, I drove up this road. Mine was the first vehicle to do so since 1962!

For the army, terrain is the most important factor in battle. For the mechanised forces, this is even more true as we must negotiate the same with 41 ton tanks and 15 ton BMPs. In Eastern Ladakh, we had to not only know the valleys, but also the surrounding mountain ranges to assist the infantry units and for during operations. The terrain is so vast that on a full reconnaissance trip, our vehicles logged 600-800 kilometres. All surrounding hill features were climbed on foot. We also climbed all infantry posts and visited all relevant Line of Actual Control (LAC) areas. Helicopter reconnaissance was also undertaken. In three months, we were the masters of the terrain.

The lay of the land

The Ladakh Range is extremely rugged. We had only three roads across it via Khardung La, Chang La and along the Indus River at Loma. The mountain ranges (including the Ladakh Range) are aligned in the north west to south east direction and the rivers run from south east to north west between them. This gives a peculiar configuration to the valleys and the LAC. Thus, if the Ladakh Range is crossed from Demchok and Koyul area to enter the Hanle Valley, the entire Indus Valley East of Loma is bypassed. Consequently, a road was planned from Hanle to Koyul-Demchok via the Photi La, and it was very difficult to construct.

During my reconnaissance and from past data, we discovered that 10 kilometres south east of Photi La was another pass called Bozardin La, which was relatively gradual. Riding on a hunch, I explored this virgin area and took numerous ‘S’ loops to take my Jonga to the top of the pass. There was no other vehicle with me. Taking a risk of being stranded, I gradually lowered my Jonga towards Koyul Valley. After a four-hour struggle, I reached Koyul and was on the Indus Valley. No one – including the Border Roads Organisation and my superiors – believed this. I proved the point after a week by taking heavier vehicles over it. Eventually, we took 10 years to construct the Photi La road, but cutting a road via Bozardin La took only one year. This, of course, happened years later, but in 1988, we were the first to take vehicles from Hanle over the Ladakh Range into the Indus Valley – another first!

Our main defences were based on the Ladakh Range and its offshoots, and the Pangog Range, west of Pangong Tso. This left nearly 80-100 kilometres of valleys and plateaus up to the LAC unmanned. These were selectively held to delay the enemy. The Chushul Sector was more compact and there, the main defences were between five to eight kilometres from the LAC.

The LAC ran along the Kailash Range, which is not held either by us or the Chinese. Both sides had plans to preempt the other to occupy the Kailash Range in event of war. Any reader would logically question as to why we were not manning the LAC right up to the front, like the LOC against Pakistan. Firstly, the LAC is not active. No shot has been fired in anger since 1967. Leaving aside approximately 10 areas of differing perceptions, there is no contest from the Chinese. The LAC is selectively manned by ITBP and at places, by regular troops.

Secondly, the terrain configuration offers no defensible features in the valleys. Thirdly, if the entire area was to be manned like the LOC, we would require 3-4 additional divisions, which is not cost-effective. Fourthly, if the enemy occupies the valleys, he would be “shelled out” by the artillery and the IAF. Lastly, the mechanised forces with their mobility are tailormade for the role of dominating valleys.

In 1988, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) did not have the strategic airlift to land tanks or ICVs in the vicinity of the LAC. The PLA formations were located in Central Tibet, 800-1000 kilometres away. Depending upon our strategy, this gave us a window of opportunity to pre-emptively secure the areas on or across the LAC or conduct deeper offensive operations. Mechanised forces were tailormade for this role.

Ladakh remains our best bet for offensive operations as it is an extension of the Tibetan plateau. The role of mechanised forces in offensive operations was, as part of overall offensive plans, to pre-emptively capture the tactical features/passes on or across the LAC. Also, as per the strategic situation in conjunction with Special Forces/ Airborne Forces, the aim was to capture areas dominating the strategic Xinjiang-Tibet Road, which runs parallel to the LAC, 80-100 kilometres to the East. This was based on the strategic situation as prevailing in 1988-90, which remains viable till today. More so, when we have a Mountain Strike Corps and a much larger mechanised forces of up to a Combat Command (grouping based on an armoured brigade with one/two armoured regiments and one/two mechanised battalions). In addition, we have much higher capability for heliborne/airborne operations.

The role in defensive operations was to dominate the valleys ahead of and around the main defences, denying the enemy any freedom of action to deploy his artillery and for logistic build up. As a result, the enemy would be forced to the higher ridges on either side of the valleys. This is a classic covering force action. Since the distances are vast, it is a prerequisite for the enemy to seize tactical control of the valleys. Securing the tactical feature on and across the LAC is part of this role. Even the enemy’s mechanised forces spearheading his offensive are at a disadvantage as the valley funnel makes him a sitting duck for our mechanised forces and the IAF.

War games

The offensive and defensive roles were validated in a series of war games. Tanks and BMPs were moved to the various areas to validate their performance. BMPs also crossed the Pangong Tso to validate the amphibious capability. Terrain similar to the operational area in the rear areas was utilised to conduct field exercises. We also took part in the exercises of the infantry formations.

Standard operating procedures (SOP) for technical maintenance and preservation of the equipment in extreme cold temperatures were evolved. The Russian-origin tanks and BMPs were tailormade for cold temperatures as long as the correct procedures were followed. At extreme cold temperatures, special oils and lubricants have to be used. The equipment must be stored in sheds during peacetime. Before starting the tanks and BMPs, pre-heaters were used to raise the oil pressure. If this was not done, the engine would wear out (particularly accessories like the air compressor). The ad hoc mechanised force was following the practice normal for wheeled vehicles of starting the engines every night for 1.5 to 2 hours, to prevent the oil and lubes and the coolant from congealing/freezing and keeping the batteries charged. While even in wheeled vehicles this is a wrong practice – tailormade oils/coolants and batteries for sub-zero temperatures are available and pre-heaters thin the congealed oil – but for tanks and BMPs, it was a disaster as engine life is measured in hours and not kilometres. Engine life of the 20 BMPs of the ad hoc force had been considerably reduced and a large number of compressors had packed up. I refused to accept the logic advanced and did a detailed study. I found that pre-heaters were not being used. In fact, drivers were not aware that they existed. Thus, the oil pressure never reached the requisite levels and was not adequately thinned to pass through narrow tubes leading to various components. Also, the basic starting method in tanks and BMPs is the ‘air start’ or ‘air cum battery start’ – the air stored in a cylinder fires the engine and in the latter case, there’s also an electric spark. In emergencies, when the air cylinder is empty, a battery start with fully charged batteries is undertaken. We found that the air bottles were leaking due to worn-out stoppers. The batteries at minus 20 degrees Celsius are reduced to 10-20 per cent capability. Air bottles are filled by the compressors when the tanks/BMPs engines are running. Hence, with empty air bottles and weak batteries, the tanks and BMPs would not start. Thus the night static running was being undertaken to charge the batteries and fill up the air bottles! In a nutshell, for the want of air cylinder stoppers and charged batteries, the engines and other parts costing lakhs of rupees were being run down. We resolved the issued by simply repairing/replacing the air cylinder stoppers to keep the air bottle full and removing the batteries which were kept in heated rooms on trickle charge, using generators. Also, the use of pre-heaters for 1.5 to 2 hours before a attempting a start was enforced. We faced no problem thereafter. All our equipment remained battle-worthy. So strict I was on this issue that in winters, before a start was attempted, the driver had to personally confirm to me that the SOP had been followed!

In end-1988, we conducted our field firing and the performance of the tanks and BMPs was validated with live fire and manoeuvre exercises on the ranges. All guns and machine guns were re-calibrated / zeroed for HAA area as they tend to fire higher.

First generation Malutka ATGM posed a peculiar problem due to the altitude. Since it is manually guided, it tended to take off high into the sky. A drill was evolved to take a ‘down’ correction with the joy stick to correct the same. Second generation ATGMs of BMP2, which have automatic guidance, posed no problem. Our passive night vision devices, which work on the principle of enhancing the ambient light, gave us double the distance due to higher ambient light in HAA even on moonless nights. This was a force multiplier. The awesome firepower of the combat group – which consisted of 28 120 mm tank guns, 42 73 mm guns of BMP1, 10 30mm cannon of BMP2, 104 Machine guns of the tanks/BMPs and 52 ATGM launchers apart from the infantry weapons of the mechanised battalion – was demonstrated to the division. The firepower of the Combat Group was more than the combined fire firepower of the entire division in terms of direct firing weapons. This was done to inspire confidence in all troops.

The crowning achievement was the test exercise attended by the GOC in C Northern Command, GOC 15 Corps and GOC 3 Infantry Division, who was testing us. We came out of the test exercise with flying colours. GOC in C Northern Command said, “The Combat Group has made history. The foundation for the employment of larger mechanised formations, which will give us the desired offensive capability, has been laid!”

We had to wait for 28 years before the induction of Combat Command in 2016 to get the enhanced capability. Though the ideal eventual requirement is of two Combat Commands and two Motorised Infantry Divisions! This size force would give us the “retributive capability” a major power should have.

Old habits

Captain B H Liddell Hart, the famous military historian said, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get the old one out.” Having stopped the static run of tanks and BMPs in 1988, I wrote a detailed SOP for maintenance and preservation of tanks and BMPs in HAA and sent it to all concerned, including a copy to all mechanised infantry battalions and armoured regiments.

In January 2000, I was Brigade Commander in Batalik and came to know that the practice had restarted. I spoke to the Corps Commander – who dug out my SOP – to stop it. In 2005, as Corps Commander, I visited Ladakh and found that the practice had commenced again. Once again, I got it stopped. In 2007, when I became GOC in C Northern Command, to my horror I found that it had recommenced due to change of units and the SOP being buried under files. Once again, I got fresh SOPs written to enforce the same. In 2016, a Combat Command was inducted into Ladakh. I read a detailed article about it in newspapers. You must have guessed: the report mentioned that this practice was in vogue to “preserve” the equipment. During my visit to 14 Corps, I briefed the staff in detail. I am sceptical whether the ghost of “static runs” for tanks and BMPs has been finally buried or still haunting the mechanised forces!