India has resisted the temptation of playing the swing state so far.
The latest phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi comes close on the heels of the PM’s visit to Ukraine three days ago, his visit to Russia last month, and a day after his phone call with US President Joe Biden. It also comes amid an escalation in the Ukraine war.
But while New Delhi’s interactions with the key stakeholders in recent weeks has triggered speculation about its mediatory role, they have mostly been in sync with how India has chosen to view the war in east Europe since its early phase back in February 2022.
Foregrounding its strategic autonomy and the balance of its interests spread across different alignments, India has resisted the temptation of playing the swing state so far.
New Delhi has also been consistent in staying away from the NATO-led West’s script of holding Moscow solely responsible for the conflict, and thus, avoided being bracketed. It has chosen to pitch diplomacy and dialogue to both Kiev and Moscow as the way out and as the route to restoring peace. From its explanatory notes on its abstentions at the UN to its firm refusal to play along the West’s sanctions against Moscow, New Delhi’s stand on the conflict has been marked with strategic clarity.
The Indian PM’s call for a “cessation of hostilities” and his G20 quip that this is “not an era of war” had mirrored India’s early advocacy of a diplomatic resolution. India was keen on ensuring that the West’s one-sided narrative on Ukraine did not slip into the G20 summit hosted by New Delhi last year. It prioritised elbow-room for balancing its interests by putting its stand in the context of the tenets of its foreign policy as well as its response to strategic interests.
Some foreign policy observers had seen it as an example of India exercising “principled pragmatism”.
Speculation about India’s role
The last few weeks of talks have fuelled speculation about India’s role as an informal peacemaker.
For the last two years or so, there has been a growing perception that India is suited for the role, having diplomatic heft within both the countries, and as an influential voice of the Global South that can command attention in both Moscow and Kiev. But it’s a tricky role, and India can’t afford to take into account the risks that it entails.
Some of the reasons for caution aren’t difficult to grasp. The assessment in a stream of diplomatic thought comes from an understanding that such mediatory roles not only bring little diplomatic rewards but in the process also expose the extent of bilateral or global clout. So, in the interest of competitive power projection, it is unwise to fall for the mediatory trap.
Moreover, from a different era, though not from too distant a past, India carries the scarred memory of burning its fingers in its Afghanistan mediation efforts in the 1980s. It was talked into mediating by the US, the results of which the Indian government only regretted.
At the same time, if New Delhi is already working in a backchannel mediatory role, it would be mindful of a wider set of options.
The growing proximity between China and Russia is viewed by India as rooted in some western chill towards Russia, limiting Moscow’s options. This is external affairs minister S Jaishankar meant when he batted for giving multiple options to Russia. “I think it makes sense to give Russia multiple options. If we railroad Russia into a single option and say that’s really bad because that’s the outcome, then you are making it a self-fulfilling prophecy,” he said.
In asking other countries to engage with Russia, the minister observed that a power like Russia, having a deep tradition of statecraft, will not be naturally inclined to depend on any one bilateral relation since it would “go against their grain”. Similarly, if New Delhi takes a mediatory role, it would have to present a set of options for Kiev to look at the conflict in a different light that shows a viable exit route.
As the war in eastern Europe is showing no signs of abating anytime soon, and the NATO-backed Ukraine and a determined Russia are still grappling to find a conclusive victory, New Delhi has been clear in its refusal to play the swing state.
Such clarity could be put to another test if the key stakeholders persuade India to be the facilitator of a diplomatic resolution.
For now, the fact that the Indian PM has accepted Putin’s invitation for the BRICS summit in Russia in October mirrors the sure-footedness of engagement that New Delhi intends to continue with Moscow, Kiev and Washington. While carefully crafting its balance of strategic interests, New Delhi has delicate times ahead in having all stakeholders’ ears in the long and faraway war in east Europe.
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